nor sertraline was found to be superior to placebo on the primary outcome measures. The authors noted, "From a methodological point of view, this study can be considered an example of the importance of including inactive and active comparators in trials testing the possible antidepressant effects of medications. In fact, without a placebo, hypericum could easily have been considered as effective as sertraline."2 What can we conclude about the ethics of this trial? One dominant viewpoint in research ethics would have prohibited the study. On this viewpoint, a randomized trial is ethical only in circumstances of "clinical equipoise"-a genuine uncertainty within the medical community as to whether (in this case) any of the three treatment arms are superior to the other two. No such uncertainty exists. Approximately twenty-five clinically available antidepressants, including sertraline, have been shown to be superior to placebo.3 Moreover, the majority opinion within psychiatry probably holds that sertraline is definitely superior to hypericum for major depression, even if hypericum has potential for the treatment of mild to moderate depression. But another widespread viewpoint would hold that the trial was ethically sound. Depressed individuals widely use hypericum, a "natural" agent, despite the lack of proven efficacy. Accordingly, a rigorous evaluation offered scientific, clinical, and social value. According to the report of trial results, the study was approved by institutional review boards (IRBs) at twelve sites and subjects provided written informed consent.
But if clinical equipoise is a basic requirement for ethical research, how could all these review boards be blind to the unethical nature of this trial? And how could two such radically divergent viewpoints exist, without research ethics being widely regarded as in a state of crisis?
Therapeutic Misconceptions
T he prevailing ethical perspective on clinical trials holds that physician-investigators can discharge their "therapeutic obligation" to patients in the context of randomized clinical trials (RCTs) as long as treatments being tested scientifically satisfy clinical equipoise. We contend that this ethical perspective is fundamentally flawed. An ethical framework that provides normative guidance about a practice should accurately characterize the practice. The prevailing ethical perspective fails this test: All sound ethical thinking about clinical research, and the regulatory framework for review of protocols for clinical investigation, depends on a basic distinction between research and therapy. But the claims in the prevailing ethical perspective on clinical trials conflate research and therapy. These claims are that the ethics of the physician-patient relationship must govern RCTs, that physicians who conduct these trials have a "therapeutic obligation" to patients enrolled in them, and that RCTs must be compatible with some form of equipoise.
Certainly, investigators and ethicists recognize that clinical trials are scientific experiments, which differ from standard medical care. They also recognize that they are subject to regulatory requirements which do not apply to routine medical practice. However, the prevailing ethical framework views clinical trials through a therapeutic lens. The mainstream ethical approach to clinical trials attempts to have it both ways: to view the clinical trial as a scientific experiment, aimed at producing knowledge that can help improve the care of future patients, and as treatment conducted by physicians who retain fidelity to the principles of therapeutic beneficence and therapeutic non-maleficence that govern the ethics of clinical medicine. The doctrine of clinical equipoise has emerged as the bridge between medical care and scientific experimentation, allegedly making it possible to conduct RCTs without sacrificing the therapeutic obligation of physicians to provide treatment according to a scientifically validated standard of care. This constitutes a "therapeutic misconception" concerning the ethics of clinical trials, analogous to the tendency of patient volunteers to confuse treatment in the context of RCTs with routine medical care.4 As Paul Appelbaum has recently observed, "In fact, this confusion between the ethics of research and of ordinary clinical care appears rampant in the world of clinical trials." 5 The therapeutic misconception in the ethics of clinical trials is reflected in the language commonly used within the clinical research enterprise. Clinical trials are often described as "therapeutic research," and investigators are regarded as having a "therapeutic intent." Research participants who are being studied because they have a medical condition under investigation are referred to as "patients," and investigators as "physicians" or "doctors," without qualification.
To demonstrate our contention about the mainstream approach to the ethics of clinical trials, we will offer an intellectual reconstruction of some of the history of research ethics since the 1970s. This history is characterized by incoherence resulting from commitment to two incompatible positions, each approaching research ethics in a fundamentally different way. The therapeutic misconception about the ethics of clinical trials has emerged from the "similarity position," which argues that ultimately, the ethics of clinical trials rest on the same moral considerations that underlie the ethics of therapeutic medicine. The "difference position"
argues that the ethics of clinical trials must start with the realization that medical research and medical treatment are two distinct forms of activity, governed by different ethical principles.
The reigning ethical paradigm for clinical trials has coexisted with clinical trials practice that departs from its guidance. Clinical equipoise, the cornerstone of the similarity position, rules out placebo-controlled trials whenever there is a proven effective treatment for the disorder under investigation.6 However, IRBs have routinely approved such placebo-controlled trials. These two anomaliesunappreciated theoretical incoherence and conflict between the theoretical paradigm and the practice of ethical review of clinical trials-call for critical examination of the similarity position and the doctrine of clinical equipoise. A major reason for distinguishing research from therapy is to underscore that clinical research has an inherent potential for exploiting research participants.9 Exploitation also may occur in clinical medicinevenal physicians sometimes perform medically unnecessary procedures for the sake of profit, for example. Yet when physicians of integrity practice medicine, physicians' and patients' interests converge. The patient desires to regain or maintain health or to relieve suffering; the physician is dedicated to providing the medical help that the patient needs.
Historically, the ethical distinction between research and therapy emerged out of concern about exploitive abuses of patients in clinical research. Reflection on this dark history gave rise to a major development in the ethics of clinical research: the requirement for independent, prospective review and approval of research protocols.12 Prior independent review was considered necessary for clinical research because of the divergence between the interests of the investigator and the research participant. Self-regulation by physician-investigators could not be trusted in the research context to the same extent that self-regulation by physicians was appropriate in the therapeutic context. The basic rationale for prospective, independent research review depends on the distinction between research and therapy.
The point of distinguishing research and therapy is not to make an invidious comparison, implying that clinical trials are more risky or ethically problematic than routine clinical practice. Indeed, there is some ev-idence that patients receive more favorable medical outcomes in many clinical trials,'3 and clinical medicine is certainly rife with ethical problems. Further, since research is more carefully regulated than medical practice, it is quite likely that fewer ethical violations occur in research. To say that two activities are ethically different is not to say that either is inherently better than the other. If the physician elected to use sertraline, she would judge each case individually to determine dose, when to change the dose, and whether to prescribe a second antidepressant or recommend other treatment. We would rant of assignment to the experimental or control treatment, which may be a placebo. Trials often include interventions such as blood draws, lumbar punctures, radiation imaging, or biopsies that measure trial outcomes but in no way benefit participants. RCTs often contain a drug "washout" phase before randomization to avoid confounding the evaluation of the investigational treatment with the effects of medication that patients were receiving prior to the trial. These various features of research design promote scientific validity; they carry risks to participants without the prospect of compensating therapeutic benefit.
Abandoning the
For these reasons, Levine argued that the second major contribution of the commission was to abandon the "illogical" distinction between therapeutic and nontherapeutic research, which previous policymakers thought was essential to the proper regulation of research and the protection of human subjects.15 Because research and therapy are distinct activities, and the ethics of therapeutic medicine therefore cannot be automatically extended to guide research, it is mistaken to label research as "therapeutic" or "nontherapeutic," as if that made any fundamental ethical difference. Many research trials consist of a complex mix of therapeutic and nontherapeutic elements-the placebo-controlled trial being only one obvious example-such that labeling the trial as a whole as "therapeutic" or "nontherapeutic" is misleading. In addition, the therapeutic-nontherapeutic distinction diverts attention from key ethical issues. Consider a nontherapeutic trial in which one interviews subjects and takes saliva samples, and a therapeutic trial in which one is testing a new cancer drug that has some promise for creating remission, but also has potentially life-threatening toxicity. Is the latter trial less in need of stringent regulatory oversight because it is "therapeutic"? Or does the therapeutic-nontherapeutic distinction distract the observer from those aspects of the trials that assume far greater moral weight, such as the level of risks and the potential vulnerability of subjects?
Once one understands the distinction between research and therapy, one realizes that "therapeutic" research is still research, and that the ethical rules appropriate to it are those appropriate for clinical research generally. Even though the patient may derive benefit from treatment being evaluated, the basic goal of the activity is not personal therapy, but rather the acquisition of generally applicable scientific knowledge. The basic goal and nature of the activity determines the ethical standards that ought to apply. (2) scientific validity; (3) fair subject selection; (4) favorable risk-benefit ratio; (5) independent review; (6) informed consent; and (7) respect for enrolled research participants. This framework is built on the difference between research and therapy and on the core value of protecting research participants from exploitation.
Yet even this formulation of an ethical framework appropriate to clinical research testifies to the hold of the similarity position. The authors endorse clinical equipoise, claiming it is implied by the requirements of value, validity, and risk-benefit ratio. We contend, by contrast, that the endorsement of clinical equipoise renders incoherent any account that arises from the difference position. The most important next step for research ethics is to develop this "non-exploitation" framework systematically in a way that avoids any conflation of clinical research with medical care.
Those who agree that physicianinvestigators who conduct clinical trials are not governed by therapeutic beneficence still might argue that clinical equipoise provides important methodological guidance for justifying clinical trials. Freedman and his colleagues have argued that clinical equipoise is both an ethical and a scientific principle: "That principle can be put into normative or scientific language. As a normative matter, it defines ethical trial design as prohibiting any compromise of a patient's right to medical treatment by enrolling in a study. The same concern is often stated scientifically when we assert that a study must start with an honest null hypothesis, genuine medical uncertainty concerning the relative merits of the various treatment arms included in the trial's design."40 Nevertheless, whatever is valid methodologically in clinical equipoise -the honest null hypothesis-can be stated more clearly and without confusion with the therapeutic obligation, by appeal to the requirement of scientific value: no research participants should be exposed to the risks of valueless research. Clinical trials must be designed to answer valuable scientific questions. If the answer is already known or the question is trivial, then there is no honest null hypothesis, and a clinical trial should not be conducted. But this is logically independent of whether all the patients enrolled in the trial would receive medical treatment that is believed by the expert medical community to be at least as good as the standard of care.
This alternative framework provides accurate ethical guidance concerning clinical research without presuming that the ethics of therapeutic medicine should govern clinical trials.
We illustrate this by applying the seven ethical requirements to the example of the hypericum-sertraline trial.
Scientific or social value and scientific validity. The study has social value owing to the widespread use of herbal remedies. Since the efficacy of hypericum in treating depression (especially major depression) was uncertain, there was an honest null hypothesis that hypericum would be no better than placebo. It would have been unreasonable to design the trial as an active-controlled superiority trial, since it is highly unlikely that hypericum could be shown to be more effective than sertraline. An active-controlled equivalence trial would lack "assay sensitivity" because the finding that the reduction in symptoms of depression experienced by those trial participants receiving hypericum was not significantly different for those receiving sertaline would not validly support the inference that hypericum was effective.41 It would remain possible that neither treatment was effective in the study sample-as was in fact shown. The study, therefore, was properly designed as a three-arm placebo-controlled trial.
Fair subject selection. There is no evidence to suggest that particularly vulnerable patients were recruited inappropriately for this study, which included a sample representative of depressed patients.
Favorable risk-benefit ratio. Risk-benefit assessment of research protocols ultimately comes down to a matter of judgment. With respect to the use of the placebo control-the aspect of the trial that violated clinical equipoise-the risks to participants from an eight-week trial, with careful exclusionary criteria and monitoring, were not excessive and were justifiable by the anticipated value of the knowledge to be gained from the research. Hence, the placebo component of the study had a favorable risk-benefit ratio. Eliminating the placebo would have made the risk-benefit ratio unfavorable by virtue of undermining the scientific validity of the research. Independent review, informed consent, and respectfor enrolled research participants. The report of the study asserted that IRB approval was obtained at all sites and that all subjects gave informed consent. In addition, the described procedures for monitoring subjects for possible risk of harm indicated an acceptable level of respect.
In sum, this study was ethically justifiable despite violating clinical equipoise; moreover, had it been designed in accordance with clinical equipoise, it would have been methodologically deficient and therefore ethically questionable.
Charles Weijer, a leading advocate of clinical equipoise and the similarity position, has recently claimed that "Placebo-controlled trials in the context of serious illnesses such as depression or schizophrenia are ethically egregious precisely because no competent physician would fail to offer therapy to a patient with the condition."42 Although we agree that depression is a serious illness, the hypericum-sertraline trial demonstrates that there is nothing "ethically egregious" about the use of placebo controls in trials of treatment for depression, as long as the ethical requirements for clinical research are satisfied. Whether or not one agrees that, all things considered, the placebo control was ethical in this trial, the ethical justification of placebo controls has nothing to do with the therapeutic practice of competent physicians. In any case, the alternative ethical framework with its seven requirements provides adequate guidance for clinical trials without appeal to the incoherent doctrine of clinical equipoise and without conflating the ethics of research with the ethics of therapy.
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